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and Associates

Plaintiff/Appellant
Architects

Defendant/Respondent

Okland Construction

Defendant/Respondent

Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.

Defendant/Respondent

Higham Hilton Mechanical
Contractors Inc.,

Defendant/Respondent

Little America Hotel Corp., a defendant in the
proceedings is not a party in this proceeding
appellant in a related appeal.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND DESCRIPTION
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This

is an appeal

from an order granting summary

judgment in favor of defendants.

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2
(3)(j) and Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3.

V.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, a statute of

repose which bars actions against contractors, planners and
designers, after seven years, violates Article I Section 11,
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
2.

Whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5

violates equal

protection of the laws as guaranteed by Article I Sections 2 &
24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14 th Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
3.

Whether

Utah

Code Ann. §78-12-25.5

applies

to a

mechanical subcontractor who merely supplies a defective sauna
heating unit to be plugged in.
1

4.

Whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 can be applied to

an out of state architect when there is no factual record to
determine whether the architect was present in Utah after it
designed the pool.
5.

Whether

the

lower

court

properly

certified

its

summary judgment order for appeal.

VI.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities
of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
All political power is inherent in the
people
and
all
free governments
are
founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government
as the public welfare may require.
Utah Const, art. I § 2.
All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
2

prosecuting or defending before any trial
in this State, by himself or counsel, in
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const, art. I § 11.
All laws of a general
uniform operation.

nature

shall

have

Utah Const, art. I § 24
The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise.
Utah Const, art. I § 26.
Sec. 7 8-12-25.5 Injury due to defective design or
construction of improvement to real property - within seven
years
1(a).

(b).
2.

An action to recover damages for any
injury to property, real or personal
or for any injury to the person, or
for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and
unsafe condition of an improvement to
real property, or any action for
damages sustained on account of the
injury, may not be brought against any
person performing or furnishing the
design,
planning,
surveying,
supervising the construction of, or
constructing the improvement to real
property more than seven years after
the completion of construction.
* * *
The time limitation imposed by this
section does not apply to any person
in actual possession and control as
owner, tenant or otherwise of the
improvement at the time the defective
and
unsafe
condition
of
the
3

improvement constitutes the proximate
cause of the injury for which an
action is brought.
This section does not extend or limit
the period otherwise prescribed by
state law for the bringing of any
action.
As used in this section:
(a)

Person
means
an
individual
corporation, partnership or other
legal entity.

(b)

"Completion
of
construction"
means the date of issuance of the
certificate
of
substantial
completion
by
the
owner,
architect, engineer
or other
agent or the date of the owner's
use
or
possession
of
the
improvement on real property.

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
judgment

in

is
favor

an

appeal
of

from

defendants

an order
Martin

granting
Stern,

summary

Jr.;

AIA

Architects and Associates; Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.; Higham
Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc.; and Okland Construction.
The defendants negligently designed and constructed a swimming
pool

and

sauna.

Eight

years

later,

while using the sauna and the pool.

4

plaintiff

was

injured

The lower court granted the summary judgment solely
because

the

allowed by

accident

occurred

after

the

seven

year

period

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 expired.
The order granting

summary judgment was entered on

August 4, 1988. On the same day, the lower court, pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certified its
order for appeal.

VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant,
action

against

seeking

James

Little

compensation

Sanchez

America
for

Hotel

extensive

(Sanchez)
Corp.
neck

commenced

(Little

and

back

his

America)
injuries

suffered when he used the Little America sauna and dove into
the Little America

swimming

pool.

James Sanchez, 11/21/87 pp, 34-48.)
July 4, 1986.

The accident happened on

Plaintiff, a guest at the Little America Hotel,

filed suit against Little America on
18).

(R. 2-18; Deposition of

January 14, 1987 (R. 2-

Through discovery, plaintiff learned the identity of the

following parties:
1.

The general contractor - Okland Construction;

5

2.

The

swimming

pool

subcontractor

-

Rocky

Mountain

Pools, Inc;
3.

The mechanical contractor responsible

for the sauna

and pool - Higham Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc;
4.

The

pool

Little

architect
America

-

Martin

Hotel

Stern,

Jr.,

Corporation

and

AIA

Answers

to

Interrogatories, copy attached as Exhibit A.
Architects and Associates, a California corporation.
The amended complaint naming these defendants was filed on or
about November 16, 1987. (R. 51-82, 89-90.)
The Little America pool and sauna were substantially
completed and inspected by Salt Lake City by the end of 1978.
More than seven years passed between the substantial completion
of the pool and the plaintiff's accident. (R. 224-225.)
The
subcontractors

general
and

contractor,

architect

all

pool

moved

the

and
trial

mechanical
court

for

summary judgment, stating that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, a
statute of repose, bars plaintiff's claims.

(R. 199-201, 219-

221, 232-234, 248-250.)
At
1.

the

summary

judgment

hearing,

Sanchez

argued:

the statute of repose violates the open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution;

6

2.

the statute of repose violates equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Utah and Federal
Constitution;

3.

the

statute

contractor

does
who

not

apply

provides

a

to

a

mechanical

defective

product

instead of constructing a defective improvement;
and
4.

there

is

not

determine

a

sufficient

whether

the

factual

statute

of

record
repose

to
was

tolled as to Martin Stern Architects Associates,
a

California

corporation,

because

the

corporation was absent from the State after it
ceased doing business with Little America.
(R. 257-270; Transcript of Proceedings 7/18/88 pp. 6-15.)
The

lower

court

granted

defendants'

motions

for

summary judgment solely because the seven year period allowed
by the statute of repose lapsed, prior to Sanchez's accident.
That

left

defendant.
an

after

appeal.

Little America

Hotel

Corp.

as the only

remaining

Over the objection of the appellant, the court, as
thought

at

the

hearing,

(R. 366-367; Tr. 5-18.)

7

certified

its

order

for

IX.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

lower

court

granted

summary

judgment

against

Sanchez solely because the diving accident occurred after the
seven year period

allowed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 a

statute of repose.
The statute has no purpose other than to immunize
architects and contractors from their torts.
The

statute violates

the open court provision of

Article I Section 24 of the Utah Constitution because:
1.

The

legislature,

person's

in

right

to

taking
sue,

away

did

the

not

injured

provide

a

substitute remedy.
2.

Their

is

no

clear

economic

or

social

evil

eliminated by the statute.
3.

Even

if

there

eliminated,

is

the

some mystical
statute

is

evil

to be

arbitrary

and

unreasonable.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1980).
Further, the statute fails even a minimum level of
equal

protection

scrutiny.

contractors

and

architects

suppliers,

materialmen

The
for

and

statute, by

immunization

owners
8

singling

while

creates

out

ignoring

unreasonable

classifications.
reasonable

Further, the classifications do not bear a

relationship

legislative purpose.
City,

752

P.2d

884

legislative purpose.

to

the

achievement

of

a

legitimate

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake
(Utah

1988).

There

is

no

legitimate

The statute's only purpose is to immunize

architects and contractors from tort liability.
In addition, there is a factual issue as to whether
the statute of repose applies to Higham-Hilton, the mechanical
contractor.

Higham-Hilton

may

be

liable

to

Sanchez

for

supplying a defective product rather than creating a defective
real property improvement.
Further, there is a factual question as to whether
the

statute

architect.

of

repose

is

tolled

against

the

out-of-state

The record does not establish whether the architect

was absent from the state after it ceased doing business with
Little America.
Finally, the case should not have been certified for
appeal.

The

issues on appeal

trial are interrelated.

and

the

issues

remaining

for

The lower court's piecemeal approach

to appeals and litigation should be discouraged.
For these reasons, the summary judgment of the lower
court should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.

9

X.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

1.

Factual Background
The Little America pool complex was completed toward

the end of 1978.
Eight

and

one-half

years

later,

Sanchez

broke

his

neck when he dove into the Little America Hotel swimming pool.
While

a guest

at

using the sauna.

the

hotel, Sanchez

had become

lightheaded

He dove into the pool to cool off.

(Sanchez

deposition p. 35.)
Within seven months of the accident Sanchez sued the
hotel.
(1)

the

Through

discovery

general

subcontractors, and
amended

complaint

Sanchez

contractor,

learned
(2)

(3) the architect.
against

the

the

the

identities of

pool

and

sauna

Sanchez then filed an

contractors

and

architect

alleging negligence, strict liability and breach of express and
implied warranty.
Sanchez's basic claim is that there were no timers or
warning signs in the sauna, and no warning signs near the pool.
Sanchez

also

alleged

that

there

was

inadequate

pool

illumination and depth markings, all of which caused Sanchez's
extensive injuries.

(R. 2-18.)
10

The trial court granted

the general contractor's,

subcontractor's and architect's motions for summary judgment.
The sole basis of the ruling was that the seven year time
period

allowed

by

the

statute

of

repose

expired

prior to

Sanchez's claim.

2.

The Standard of Review.
Because this appeal presents only questions of law,

the Utah Supreme court reviews the trial court's rulings for
correctness and accords them no particular deference.

Mountain

Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988),
For purposes of the record, it must be assumed that both the
contractor and the architect were negligent in designing and
constructing the pool and sauna.

see, Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d

568, 71 (1973).

3.

The Standard of Repose.
The applicable statute of repose reads:

Sec. 78-12-25.5 Injury due to defective design or construction
of improvements or real property - within seven years;
(l)(a)
An action to recover damages for
any injury to property, real or
personal, or for any injury to the
person, or for bodily injury or
wrongful death, arising out of the
defective and unsafe condition of an
11

improvement to real property, or any
action for damages sustained on
account of such injury, may not be
brought against any person performing
or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision
of construction or
construction of such improvement to
real property more than seven years
after the completion of construction•
* * *

(2)

The limitation
imposed by this
provision shall not apply to any
person in actual possession and
control as owner, tenant or otherwise,
of the improvement at the time of
defective and unsafe condition of such
improvement constitutes the proximate
cause of the injury for which it is
proposed to bring an action,
•

(4)

injury

to

*

As used in this section,
(1)

"Person"
shall
mean
an
individual,
corporation,
p a r t n e r s h i p , or any o t h e r l e g a l
entity.

(2)

Completion of c o n s t r u c t i o n
for
the purposes of t h i s a c t s h a l l
mean t h e d a t e of issuance of a
certificate
of
substantial
completion
by
the
owner,
architect,
engineer
or
other
agents,
or
t h e d a t e of
the
owner's use or p o s s e s s i o n of t h e
improvement on r e a l p r o p e r t y .

The s t a t u t e
for

*

real

applies
or

to a l l

personal

12

actions

property,

seeking

bodily

damages

injury

or

wrongful death.

Hooper Water Improvement District v. Reeve,

642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982) .
The statute of repose is sweeping and absolute once
the seven year statutory period lapses.

The statute prevents

the injured, the owner and all others from suing the designer,
planner, or contractor.
(Utah

1974).

It

Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223, 224

grants

a

special

immunity

liability to the contractors and architects.

from

future

Hooper, at 747;

see, Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).
Since the statute begins to run from a date unrelated to the
injury, it is not designed to allow a reasonable time for
filing of an action once a person is injured.

see, Berry v.

Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985).
The

lower

court

ruled

that

the

statute

bars

plaintiff's lawsuit even though the cause of action did not
arise

until

after

it

was

barred.

The

statute

cuts

off

Sanchez's action even though it was filed within the applicable
four year statute of limitations.
The

statute

is

not

designed

to

abolish

minimal

claims.

On the contrary, "Its obvious intent was to protect

persons

performing

or

furnishing

the

design,

supervision of construction or construction of
from indefinite future liability."
13

planning,

improvements

Hooper, supra at 747.

This

immunity

is not related to culpability.

applies regardless of whether the conduct is intentionalapplies

whether

there

is

negligence

or

strict

It
It

liability.

Further, neither the apparent danger of the construction nor
the

expected

immunity

useful

conferred.

life

of

The

the

construction

immunity protects

affects

the

the contractor,

planner or designer whether the building has a useful life of
ten or one hundred years.

Contractors

and architects

are

protected even if the defect is not detectable by the owner or
user so the injured is wholly unable to protect himself.

c.f.

Berry at 673.

4.

Historical Context of Contractor Liability Law
The

liability

of

contractors,

architects,

and

engineers engaged in the construction of buildings follows the
general path of product liability law but lags behind product
liability

law by some twenty years. W.L. Prosser

and W.P.

Keeton, The Law of Torts, §104A at 722 (5 ed. 1984).
Originally,

the

courts

held

that

a

contractor,

architect or engineer could not be liable once the structure
was completed and accepted by the owner. Id.

As in the case of

products liability law, the change in the law began with a

14

series

of

exceptions.

These exceptions

permitted

lawsuits

directly against the contractor or architect where:
1.

The

contractor

knew

it

was

dangerous

and

defective; or
2.

The individual plaintiff's use was intended

or

anticipated; or
3.

The construction was imminently dangerous; or

4.

The construction was a nuisance infringing on
the rights of land owners or the public.

Prosser, at 723.
As

in

the

case

of

products

liability

law,

the

exceptions swallowed up the rule until the analogy of McPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. was presently and finally accepted. Prosser,
at 723.

The contractor is now liable to all those who may

foreseeably be injured by the structure, not only when he fails
to disclose known dangerous conditions, but also when the work
is negligently done.

This applies not only to contractors

doing original work, but also to those who make repairs or
install parts, architects and engineers.

There is liability

for negligent design as well as for negligent construction.
Prosser, at 723.
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5.

Utah Const. Article I Section 11 - Utah's Open Courts
Provision
Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is part

of

the

declaration

constitution.

of

rights

contained

in

our

State's

It declares that an individual shall have a

right to a remedy by due course of law, for injury to person,
property or reputation.

Its purpose is directly contrary to

that of the statute of repose.
Utah Const, art. I § 11 reads:
All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay. . . .
Thirty-seven
provisions.

The

states

concept

have

of

the

originated with the Magna Carta.

similar
open
Berry

constitutional

courts

provision

v. Beech Aircraft

Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1985).
Utah's

constitutional

court is not an empty gesture.

guarantee

of

access

Rather it:

[I]s solid core upon which all our state
laws must be premised. Clearly and unequivocally our constitution directs that the
courts of this state shall be open to the
injured and oppressed.
We are unable to
view this constitutional mandate as a faint
echo to be skirted or ignored. Our constitution is free to provide greater protection for our citizens than are required
under the federal constitution. . .Our
16

to

the

constitution has spoken and it is our duty
to listen.
Berry, at p. 676-677 quoting Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative
Building Supply Assoc, 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S.D. 1974].
Individuals are entitled to a remedy by due course of
law

for

injuries

to person, property

or

reputation.

The

purpose of Article I Section 11 is to limit the legislature's
power to change laws when the changes are detrimental to the
persons who are injured.

The injured are generally isolated in

society, belong to no identifiable group and rarely are able to
rally the political process to their aid.

Berry, at p. 676.

Recently, this Court determined whether a similar
statute of repose violates Article I Section II.

In Berry,

supra, the court, after using a two part analysis, held that a
products

liability

statute

of

repose

violates

Utah's

open

courts provision.

The Berry analysis dictates the same result

in this case.

The statute of repose violates Article I,

Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
In Berry, this court said:
Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides
an
injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative by due cause of law.
•

*

*

The benefit provided by the substitute must
be substantially equal in value or other
benefit to the remedy abrogated.
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although the
different.

form of

the remedy may be

Berry, at 680; see generally, Maisch v. United States Smelting
and Refining and Mining Co,, 113 U. 101, 191 P.2d 612, 624
(1984) .
In the present case, the legislature did not provide
a substitute remedy.

Prior to the statute of repose, injured

persons like Sanchez, could sue the owner, the contractors and
the

architect

for

injury

compensation.

Because

of

the

statute, Sanchez can only sue the owner.
In Berry, the court explained that if there is no
substitute remedy provided, (and in this case there is none),
the statute of repose may be justified only if there is a
clear,

social

or

economic

evil

to

be

eliminated,

and

elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
In

Berry,

the

legislature's

purpose, as

set

Berry, at 680.
forth

in the

statute, was to reduce the evil of high insurance premiums.
This Court rejected the statute's purpose.
In this case, unlike Berry, the statute does not set
forth any clear social or economic evil to be eliminated.
is apparent
purpose
planners

and
and

It

from the statute itself, that the sole object,
scope

of

the

contractors

statute
immunity
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is
from

to

grant

lawsuits

designers,
for

their

tortious conduct.

Hooper, supra; see, Broome v. Truluck, 241

S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 1978).

The statute has no other purpose.

There is no social or economic evil to be eliminated.
Even if there is some mystical social or economic
evil to be eliminated by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, summary
judgment is inappropriate because the court is required to make
a factual finding as to whether the statute is an arbitrary and
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
In Berry, this court
statute

of

repose

to

be

Berry, at 682.

found a product's

unreasonable,

liability

arbitrary

and

unconstitutional on the following facts:
a.

The statute applied

to all kinds of products

irrespective of the product's useful life;
b.

The record did not establish any

significant

increase in product's liability litigation in Utah;
c.

The statute could not reduce premiums because

insurance companies set premiums on nationwide data;
d.

The

number

of

claims

barred

would

not

be

incentive

to

sufficient to affect insurance premiums rates.
e.

The

statute

would

provide

manufacturers to make their products safe.
Berry, at 681-83.
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less

In the present case, the identical

facts set forth

above, so far as they are known, establish that this statute is
unreasonable, arbitrary

and unconstitutional.

The statute

applies to all kinds of construction irrespective of its useful
life.

The

record

does

not

establish

construction liability litigation.
insurance

premiums

are

lowered.

any

increase

in

There is nothing suggesting
The statute provides

less

incentive to make real property improvements safe.

B.

THE STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS
GUARANTEED
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

1.

Introduction.
Equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by Article

I

Section

Amendment

2
of

&
the

24

of

United

the

Utah

States

Constitution

Constitution.

and
They

follows:
[N"|o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the priviLeges or
immunities
of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without
due process of laws; nor deny to any person
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
All political power is inherent in the
people
and
all
three governments
are
founded on their authority for their equal

20

the

14th

read

as

protection and benefit and they have the
right to alter or reform their government
as the public welfare may require.
Utah Const, art. I § 2.
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
Utah Const, art. I § 24.
The fundamental principle of both state and federal
equal protection provisions is that legislative classifications
resulting in differing treatment for different persons must be
based on actual differences that are reasonably related to the
legitimate purposes of the legislation.
Co. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d

Mountain Fuel Supply

884 (Utah 1988); Malan v.

Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d
261, 266 (Utah 1986).

The latitude granted the legislature in

making the classification depends upon the subject matter of
the statute and the statute's objective.

If the statute

infringes on sensitive constitutional rights or if the statute
is based on a suspect classification, the legislature's power
to classify is substantially narrowed. Bishop, at 266.

2.

The Rights Impaired by the Statute of Repose.
The sole object, purpose and scope of the statute of

repose is to prevent injured persons, like Sanchez, from suing
architects and contractors for their torts once seven years
21

pass

after

completed.

the

real

estate

improvement

is

substantially

Hooper, supra; see, Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d

739, 740 (S.C. 1978).
As

stated

in

part

"A"

of

this

argument,

the

appellant's right to seek compensation through the courts is a
right protected by the state constitution.

It is part of the

"declaration of rights" set forth in the Utah Constitution.
Berry, at 674.
The

Utah

Supreme Court, in

Bracken v. Dahle, 251

P.16, 20 (Utah 1926), characterized the right to apply to the
courts for redress of wrongs as a "substantial right".

3.

The Standard of Scrutiny.
A threshold issue in this case is to determine the

standard of equal protection scrutiny that should be applied to
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5
If this court decides

that Sanchez's

"substantial

right", a right protected by our constitution, is a fundamental
right,

then

standard".

this

court

should

apply

a

"strict

scrutiny

A strict scrutiny standard requires the statute to

advance or protect a compelling state interest in order to
sustain the classification.

e.g.) Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,

216, 217 (1982).
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If this court determines that appellant's right to
sue is not a fundamental right, but a right that is entitled to
more protection than economic rights, the court should choose
to apply a more rigorous review than the traditional rational
basis

test.

The

test

is

whether

the

classification

is

substantially related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Cases

striking

down

statutes

of

limitation

or

statutes of repose after applying an intermediate level of
review are:

Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), and

Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
The minimum level of review that any classification
statute must pass is whether the classification is a reasonable
one and bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a
legitimate legislative purpose.

Mountain Fuel, supra at 890.

Because the appellant's right to bring an action is
protected by our constitution, and is a "substantial right",
this court should apply a heightened standard of review.

4.

The Classifications Created by the Statute of Repose are
not Reasonable, nor are they Reasonably Related to
the Achievement of a legitimate Legislative Purpose.
a.

The classifications created by the statute of repose
are not reasonable.
23

Equal protection, at a minimum, requires

that the

statutory classification be reasonable and have a reasonable
relationship to the achievement of a legitimate legislative
purpose.

Mountain Fuel, at 889.
It is a two part test, the first part requires that

there be a reasonable classification. Id.
cannot be arbitrary.

Broome, at 740.

The classification

The classification fails

if the benefits granted to some are denied to others. Id.
Although Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is sweeping and
absolute, it is not all encompassing in its application.

The

statute benefits only planners, architects and contractors.

It

does not apply to others whose negligence in the improvement of
real property causes damage or injury to others.
suppliers

and

manufacturers

unprotected, so are owners.

of

building

Materialmen,

components

are

In fact, the owner is specifically

excluded from the protection of the statute.

Utah Code Ann.

§78-12-25.5; Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974).
Only architects, planners and contractors are singled
out for preferential treatment.
justifies

granting

engineers

and

immunity

to

immunity

contractors

owners

and

There is no distinction which

to
on

one
one

group;
hand,

manufacturers.

appears for making the distinction.
24

the architects,

and
No

not

granting

rational

Broome, at 740.

basis

Skinner

v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967). Fujioka v. Kam, 514
P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973) .
Several
construction

courts

statutes

classifications.

of

have

considered

repose

whether

establish

similar

unreasonable

The overwhelming majority conclude that the

statute violates equal protection.
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967).

Skinner v. Anderson, 231

Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739

(S.C. 1978); Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973); Shibuya
v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 P.2d 276 (Haw. 1982); Loyal
Order

of Moose Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla.

1977); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454
(Wis. 1978).
The first and leading case to consider whether there
is a rational basis for treating architects and contractors
engaged in the improvement of real property differently than
others similarly situated was Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d
588 (111. 1967).

In Skinner, the court persuasively reasoned:

More important is the fact that of all of
those whose negligence in connection with
the construction of an improvement to real
estate resulting in damage to property or
injury
to
person more than four years
after construction is completed, the
statute singles out the architect and the
contractor and grants them immunity. It is
not at all inconceivable that the owner or
person in control of such an improvement
might be held liable for damage or injury
that results from a defective condition
25

for which the architect or contractor is in
fact responsible. Not only is the owner or
person in control given no immunity, the
statute takes away his action for indemnity
against the architect or contractor.
The arbitrary quality of the statute
clearly appears when we consider that
architects and contractors are not the only
persons
whose
negligence
in
the
construction of a building or other
improvement may cause damage to property
or injury to persons. Skinner, at p. 591.
Such

is

the

present

case.

Sanchez,

sued

the

architect, the contractor, the subcontractors and the owner.
Ordinarily, the owner would have a claim for indemnification
against

the

responsible

contractor.

crossclaimed against the contractors.

Little

America

However, the summary

judgment order entered by the lower court grants immunity to
the

contractors

and

takes

away

Little

America's

right

to

indemnity.
A statute which grants immunity to the architect and
the contractors who should and would be, but for the statute
primarily responsible for the injuries, and burdens the owner
with

liability

for

the

damages

proximately

caused

by

the

negligence of the architect and contractors is clearly unfair,
unreasonable and arbitrary.

The classification is not founded

upon a reasonable distinction or difference necessitated by
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state policy.

The statute violates equal protection of the

laws. Fujioka, at p. 571.

b.

The

classification

relationship

to

does

the

not

bear

achievement

of

a

reasonable

a

legitimate

legislative purpose.
The statute of repose also flunks the second part of
the minimum equal protection test; that is, the classification
does not bear a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a
legitimate legislative purpose.

See generally, Mountain Fuel

Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988).
The equal protection analysis for determining whether
a

classification

bears

a

reasonable

relationship

to

the

achievement of a legislative purpose is essentially identical
to the analysis used by this court in deciding open courts
provision cases, that is whether there is "a clear social or
economic

evil

to

be eliminated

and

the elimination

of an

existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means
for achieving the objective".

Compare Berry, at 680-683 with

Mountain Fuel, at 890-891.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5

does not set forth its

purpose, but it is obvious that its only purpose is to protect
architects

and

contractors

from
27

future

liability

for their

torts.

Hooper, supra; Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647

P.2d 276 (Haw. 1912).

The same argument contained on pages 18-

19 of this brief applies in equal protection analysis.
immunizing

persons

from

their

torts, standing

If

alone, is a

legitimate legislative purpose, all statutes of repose would be
constitutional.
courts

Furthermore, the equal protection and open

guarantees

constitution.

would

be

useless

appendages

to

our

That kind of analysis could result in allowing

the legislature to abolish any or all remedies for injured
persons.

It is an analysis specifically rejected in Berry.

see, Berry, at 676-678.
In

summary,

the

statute

of

repose

creates

unreasonable classifications and the classifications are not
related to achieving a legitimate state purpose.

For both of

these reasons, the statute fails any minimum equal protection
scrutiny.

C.

THERE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS TO DETERMINE
WHETHER UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5 APPLIES TO HIGHAM
HILTON MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.
Utah

improvements

to

Code
real

Ann.

§78-12-25.5

property.

An

applies

improvement

only
to

to
real

property is "a permanent addition to or a betterment of real
property that enhances its capital value and it involves the
28

expenditure of

labor or money and is designed to make the

property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordering
repairs."

Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d

454, 456 (Wis. 1975).
Higham-Hilton, the mechanical subcontractor, contests
the allegation that it constructed or installed the sauna at
Little

America.

Vice

President,

Stanley

Nakamura,

in

a

deposition taken June 20, 1988 testified that Higham-Hilton
delivered a heating unit to be plugged in:
Q:

Who installed the heating unit in the sauna?

A:

What do you mean, "Who installed it?"

There's

nothing to install.
Q:

Just plug it in and it works?

A:

Just plug it in and it works.

(Deposition of Stanley Nakamura, 6/28/88 pp. 20.)
In other words, Higham-Hilton may have furnished a
defective

product

improvement.

rather

than

constructing

a

defective

If Higham-Hilton delivered a defective product,

then Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is not applicable.

It is

simply too early to tell in this litigation whether Utah Code
Ann.

§78-12-25.5

prohibits

Sanchez's

Hilton.

29

claim

against

Higham-

D.

THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENT FACTUAL RECORD TO DETERMINE IF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5, BARS SANCHEZ'S CLAIMS
AGAINST MARTIN STERN, JR., AIA ARCHITECT AND ASSOC.
Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architect and Assoc, is a

California corporation.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-35 provides:

Where a cause of action accrues against a
person when he is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term
that is limited by this chapter after his
return to the state. If after a cause of
action accrues he departs from the state,
the time of his absence is not part of the
time limited for the commencement of the
action.
Section

7-12-35

applies

to

foreign

corporations.

Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72 Utah 137, 269
P.

147

(1928).

It

is

simply

too

early

to

tell

in this

litigation, whether Martin Stern, ceased doing business within
the State

of

Utah

after

it completed

America on the swimming pool and sauna.
limitations

contained

in

§78-12-25.5

its work

for Little

If it did, the time
would

be

tolled

and

Sanchez's complaint was timely filed against the architect.

E.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CERTIFYING THIS CASE FOR APPEAL.
As an apparent afterthought, the lower court, over

the objections of the appellant, certified
against

the

general

contractor,

architect for appeal.
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Sanchez's claims

the subcontractor, and the

Mr. Kanell:
Your Honor, in light of the
fact this case will be ongoing, and 1 have
not presented this by way of pleadings, I
think it might be appropriate to have this
matter certified as a final order under 54
(b).

* * *

Judge Young: Consistent with the need and
the statute of repose desire to resolve
issues, it would appear appropriate this
request of Mr. Kanell should be granted and
that will be certified as a final order for
the purpose of 54(b).
(R. Tr. pp. 17-18. )
The

lower

court

reasoned

that

because

there was

nothing remaining as to these defendants, the appeal should be
certified

for review.

Unfortunately, whether there remains

anything to do, as to certain defendants is not the criteria
for deciding whether to certify a case for appeal.

It is only

one element of a three element test.
Before the lower court can certify the claims for
appeal, it must make three findings:
(1)

There must be multiple claims for relief;

(2)

The

judgment

appealed

from

must

have

been

entered in an order that would be appealable
but for the fact that other claims or parties
remained in the action;
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(3)

There must be a finding that there is no just
reason for delay of the appeal.

Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., P.2d 765, 67 (Utah 1984).
these requirements must be met before the
certified for appeal.
"•

Id. at 768.

All of

judgment can be

Rule 54(b) certifications

. .should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy to

counsel."
1983).

Hayden v. McDonald, 719 F.2d

266, 68

(8th Cir.

Certification should be used only in the infrequent

harsh case.

Page v. Gulf Oil Corp., 775 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.

1985) .
Elements (1) and (2) are present in this case, but
element (3) is not.

The appeal should have been delayed.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) is modeled after
and is essentially identical to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, Utah courts often rely heavily

upon federal court decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) to explain the operation of Utah's Rule 54(b).
Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 65 (Utah
1986).
In Curtis-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446
U.S.

1 (1980), the United States Supreme Court outlined the

factors a trial court must use in determining whether there is
no just reason for delay.

They are:
32

1.

whether

the

certification

will

result

in

unnecessary appellant review;
2.

whether

the

adjudicated

claims

are separate,

distinct and independent of any of the other
claims to be tried;
3.

whether the adjudicated claims would be mooted
by any future development in the case;

4.

whether the nature of the adjudicated claims is
such

that

no

appellate

court

would

have

to

decide similar issues more than once, even if
there were subsequent appeals.
Curtis-Wright Corp., at 8, 9.

The foregoing factors show that

this case should not have been certified for appellate review.
If Sanchez wins a substantial verdict against Little
America, fully compensating his injuries, there is no need to
appeal the lower court's dismissal.

Sanchez's claim would be

moot.
On the other hand, if Sanchez loses the litigation
against Little America, there will be two appeals doubling the
workload of this court on inter-related issues.
If the appellant court will be required to address
legal or factual issues that are similar to the pending claims,
the adjudicated

claims

should

not be certified
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for appea].

Morrison Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir.
1981) •

The test is simply whether the appellate court must

familiarize itself with or review the same set of facts twice.
Hayden v. McDonald, 719 F.2d, 270 (8th Cir. 1981).
The lower court certification almost guarantees at
least two trials and three appeals increasing the workload for
this court and the trial court.
claim will be tried.

First, the Little America

The court will try the accident.

If

Sanchez is not fully compensated, there will be an appeal of
the Little America

trial

and

contractors and architects.
accident.

subsequent

trial

against

the

The trial court will again try the

If Little America wins, it will appeal its claims

for indemnification against the contractor and architect.
It
litigation

is

that

this
Rule

piecemeal
54(b)

Curtis-Wright Corp., supra;

was

approach
designed

to
to

appeals
prevent.

and
e.g.

Page v. Gulf Oil Corp., 775 F.2d

1331 (5th Cir. 1985) .

XI.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5

bars

appellant's

claim

against the contractor and architect solely because the diving
accident occurred eight years instead of seven years after the
34

swimming

pool

appellant's

was

access

constructed.
to

the

courts

The

statute

guaranteed

violates

by Article I

Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
Because the statute also singles out architects and
contractors

for

immunity

from

their

torts

while

ignoring

materialmen, suppliers and owners, the statute also creates
unreasonable classifications.

Further, the classification does

not achieve a legitimate legislative purpose.

In short, the

statute violates equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Utah and United States Constitution.
The

summary

judgment

entered

by

the

lower court

should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
DATED this HC^IA

day of

ry^tl}

, 1989.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

By

j^Mi*

35

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Q[)j^

I certify that on the

day of

P^CKL^A

1989, I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, (Sanchez v. Little America, et al), postage
prepaid, by depositing copies of the same in the U.S. Mail to:
Lee Henning
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Respondent Higham-Hilton Mechanical
Contractors, Inc.
175 South West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Jeffrey SilvesLrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT AND SEGAL
Attorneys for Respondent Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architects &
Associates
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Donald J. Purser
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BARRETT, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent Okland Construction Co,
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Theodore Kanell
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Respondent Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Paul Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Cross-Claimant/Appellant Little America
Hotel Corp,
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Donald J. Purser, 2663
Dwight C. Packard, 5005
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
A Professional Corporation
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
Attorneys for Defendant
Okland Construction Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
V.

LITTLE AMERICA MOTEL, INC.,
a Utah corporation; LITTLE
AMERICA REFINING CO., INC.,
a Utah corporation, d/b/a
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL; MARTIN
STERN, JR. & ASSOCIATES;
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., a
Utah corporation; ROCKY
MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC.; a Utah
corporation; HIGHAM-HILTON
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.,
a Utah corporation and JOHN
DOES I through III,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS MARTIN
STERN, JR. AND AIA ARCHITECT AND
ASSOCIATES, ROCKY MOUNTAIN POOL,
INC., HIGHAM-HILTON MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC. AND OKLAND
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Civil No. C87-268
(Judge David S. Young)

Defendants.

Defendants' motions for summary judgment came on for hearing
on July 18, 1988, the Honorable David S. Young, District Court
Judge,

presiding.
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All

named

parties

in

the

action

made

appearances and were represented by counsel.

The Court heard

argument and found that more than seven years had elapsed from
the

time

that

the

contruction

of

Little America

Hotel was

substantially complete and the date that the present action was
filed;
Wherefore, for good cause appearing, and pursuant to 78-1225.5 Utah Code Annotated, it is hereby ordered that summary
judgment is granted in favor of Defendants Martin Stern, Jr. and
AIA Architect & Associates, Inc., Rocky Mountain Pool, Inc.,
Higham-Hilton

Mechanical

Contractors,

Inc.,

and

Okland

Construction Company, and pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court further expressly determines that
there is no just reason for delay and therefore directs the
entry of final judgment dismissing with prejudice each and every
claim and cause of action of the Plaintiff against Defendants
Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect & Associates, Inc., Rocky
Mountain Pool, Inc., Higham-Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc.,
and Okland Construction Company.
DATED this

day of August, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S. YOUNG
District Court Judge
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APPROVED/AS TO FORM:

/"Paul Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Little America Motel

TKeodore Kanell
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys
for Rocky
Mountain Pools

Lee Hennmg
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Higham-Hilton

Dale F. Gardiner
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Je^/sTlve^strini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Martin Stern
and AIA Architect & Associates

D^ght\C. Paclcard
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
Attorneys for Okland
Construction
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

>'"• CO

day of August, 1988, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS MARTIN STERN, JR. AND AIA ARCHITECT AND
ASSOCIATES, ROCKY MOUNTAIN POOL, INC., HIGHAM-HILTON MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC. AND OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY was served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mails, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Paul Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lee Henning
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jeff Silverstrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Theodore Kanell
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dale F. Gardiner
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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